1. Finnis, J. (2000) “Some fundamental evils in generating human embryos by cloning” in Mazzoni, C.M. (2000) Etica della Ricerca Biologica Florence: Leo S. Olschki. [Back]
2. Cells from a clone embryo would, of course, be more compatible with those of the patient. [Back]
3. Cavazzana-Calvo, M. et al. (2000) “Gene therapy of human severe combined immunodeficiency (SCID)-X1 disease”, Science 288, 669-672, April 28. [Back]
4. Associated Press (2000) “Approach may renew worn hearts”, Nov 12. See also Wang, J.S. et al. (2000) “Marrow stromal cells for cellular cardiomyoplasty: Feasibility and potential clinical advantages”, J Thorac Cardiovasc Surg 120, 999-1006, Nov; Scorsin, M. et al. (2000) “Comparison of the effects of fetal cardiomyocyte and skeletal myoblast transplantation on post-infarction left ventricular function”, J Thorac Cardiovasc Surg 119, 1169-1175, 6. [Back]
5. Tuszynski, M.H. (2000) “Intraparenchymal NGF infusions rescue degenerating cholinergic neurons”, Cell Transplant 9, 629-636, SeptOct. [Back]
6. Horwitz, E.M. et al. (1999) “Transplantability and therapeutic effects of bone marrow-derived mesenchymal cells in children with ontogenesis imperfecta”, Nat.Med. 5, 309-313, March. [Back]
7. Schwab, I.R. et al. (2000) “Successful transplantation of bioengineered tissue replacements in patients with ocular surface disease”, Cornea 19, 421-426, July. [Back]
8. Traynor, A.E. et al. (2000) “Treatment of severe systemic lupus erythematosus with high-dose chemotherapy and haemopoietic stem-cell transplantation: a phase 1 study”, Lancet 356, 701-707, August 26. [Back]
9. Martini, A. et al. (1999) “Marked and sustained improvement 2 years after autologous stem cell transplant in a girl with system sclerosis”, Rheumatology 38l, 773, August. [Back]
10. Burt, R.K. et al. (1999) “Hematopoietic stem cell transplantation of multiple sclerosis, rheumatoid arthritis, and systemic lupus erythematosus”, Cancer Treat. Res. 101, 157-184. [Back]
11. Dunkel, I.J. et al. (2000) “Successful treatment of metastatic retinoblastoma”, Cancer 89, 2117-2121, Nov 15. [Back]
12. In the case of cells from older embryos or foetuses, scientists are experimenting with “embryoid body-derived” cells created from embryonic cells, which seem easier to control (Shamblott, M.J. et al. (2001) “Human embryonic germ cell derivatives express a broad range of developmentally distinct markers and proliferate extensively in vitro”, Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 98, 113-118, Jan 2). [Back]
13. Folkerth, R.D., Durso, R. (1996) “Survival and proliferation of nonneural tissues, with obstruction of cerebral ventricles, in a parkinsonian patient treated with fetal allografts”, Neurology 46, 1219-25. [Back]
14. Weber, W., Butcher, J. (2001) “Doubts over cell therapy for Parkinson's disease”, Lancet 357, 859, March 17. [Back]
15. Vogel G. (2000) “Stem Cells: New Excitement, Persistent Questions”, Science 290, 1674, 1 December. [Back]
17. Aldous, P. (2001) “Can they rebuild us?” Nature 410, 622-623 April 5. [Back]
18. However, it is not necessary for this argument to question whether, and if so to what degree, these personal characteristics might be shared by another species. The presence of one or even several “fellow travellers” does nothing to undermine the intrinsic worth or dignity of specifically human life, and it is this that is at issue here. [Back]
19. We are using the term “subject” rather than “person” because there are now so many conflicting meanings of “person” that the word often confuses rather than clarifies discussion. [Back]
20. De duabus naturis, c.3; cf. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologia Ia Q. 29 art. 1. [Back]
21. Not only classical philosophers but also many great philosophers of the twentieth century have attempted to hold together the unity and the transcendence of human beings, and so avoid the twin errors of “reductionism” and “dualism”. Examples are Whitehead, Wittgenstein (both early and late), Heidegger, Husserl and many modern followers of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. [Back]
22. Flew, A. (1978) The Rational Animal Oxford: Clarendon Press; Midgely, M. (1979) Beast and Man London: Methuen; Braine, D. (1992) The Human Person: Animal and Spirit Notre Dame, Indiana: UNDP; Olson, E. (1997) The Human Animal Oxford: OUP. [Back]
23. Gilbert, S. (1997) 5th ed. Developmental Biology, New York: Sinauer Assoc, p. 121. [Back]
24. Gilbert (1997) p. 3. [Back]
25. Wolpert, L. (1991) The Triumph of the Embryo Oxford: OUP, p. 11. [Back]
26. Walbot, V., Holder, N. (1987) Developmental Biology New York: Random House, p. 26. [Back]
27. Alberts, B. et al. (1989) Molecular Biology of the Cell 2nd ed. New York: Garland Publishing, p. 881. [Back]
28. Gilbert (1997) p. 186. [Back]
29. Wolpert, L. (1998) Principles of Development Oxford: OUP, p. 80. [Back]
30. Very occasionally, the process of separation of the twins is incomplete, leading to conjoined twins. However even in this case one can generally recognise two individuals (hence the term “conjoined twins”). The process which gives rise to conjoined twins seems to be a distinct process with a different cause from that which gives rise to the formation of a disorganised teratoma. [Back]
McWhinnie, A. (1996) “Outcome for Families Created by Assisted Conception Programmes” Journal of Assisted Reproduction and Genetics 13 (4), p. 363.32. Even if the abortion in question were supposed to be of “such moral complexity” as not to be “inevitably so heinous” (Polkinghorne, J. et al. (1989) Review of the Guidance on the Research Use of Fetuses and Fetal Material London: HMSO, para. 2.7) it cannot be appropriate that the agents of a child's death should give consent to the use of his or her body. Involvement in killing, even without subjective culpability, disqualifies one from acting as an executor, cf. Keown, J. (1993) “The Polkinghorne Report on Fetal Research: Nice Recommendations, Shame About the Reasoning” Journal of Medical Ethics 19 (2) 114-120. [Back]
33. Cf. Elshtain, J.B. “To Clone or Not To Clone?” and Tracy, D. “Human Cloning and the Public Realm: A Defense of Intuitions of the Good” in Nussbaum, M.C., Sunstein, C.R. (1998) Clones and Clones: Facts and Fantasies about Human Cloning New York: W.W. Norton & Co.; Kass, L. “The Wisdom of Repugnance” in Pence G.E. (1998) Flesh of My Flesh: The Ethics of Cloning Humans Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield; Midgley, M. (2000) “Biotechnology and Monstrosity: Why We Should Pay Attention to the "Yuk Factor"” Hastings Center Report 30 (5) 715. [Back]
34. Cf. Gould, S.J. “Dolly's Fashion and Louis's Passion” in Pence (1998); Lewontin, R.C. (1993) The Doctrine of DNA: Biology as Ideology London: Penguin Books; Appleyard, B. (1999) Brave New Worlds London: HarperCollins, esp. ch. 5. [Back]
35. Cf. Holm, S. (1998) “Life in the Shadow: One Reason Why We Should Not Clone Humans” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 7 (2) 160-162. [Back]
36. Kitcher, P. “Whose Self Is It Anyway?” in Pence (1998). [Back]
37. Eg. Ashley, B., Moraczewski, A. (1994) “Is the Biological Subject of Human Rights Present from Conception?” in Cataldo, P., Moraczewski, A. The Fetal Tissue Issue: Medical and Ethical Aspects Braintree Mass.: Pope John Centre; Banner, M. (1998) “Christian Anthropology at the Beginning and End of Life” Scottish Journal of Theology 51: 21-60; Barry, R. “The Personhood and Individuality of Unborn Human Life” in Barry (1989) Medical Ethics New York: Peter Lang; Bracken, C.P. (2001) “Is the Early Embryo a Person?” Linacre Quarterly 68 (1) 49-70; Cameron, N. (1990) “When Does Life Begin?” in Is Life Really Sacred? Eastbourne: Kingsway Publications; Crosby, J. (1993) “The Personhood of the Human Embryo” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 18 (4), 399-417; Doerflinger, R. (1999) “The Ethics of Funding Embryonic Stem Cell Research” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9 (2) 137-150; Fisher, A. (1991) “Individuogenesis and a Recent Book by Fr Norman Ford” Anthropotes 7; Foster, J. (1985) “Personhood and the Ethics of Abortion” in Channer, J. ed. Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life Exeter: Paternoster Press; Gallagher, J. (1985) Is the Human Embryo a Person? A Philosophical Investigation Toronto: Human Life Research; Grisez, G. (1989) “When Do People Begin?” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 63, 22-47; Heaney, S. (1992) “Aquinas and the Presence of the Human Rational Soul in the Early Embryo” The Thomist 56, 1; Howsepian, A.A. (1992) “Who or What Are We?” Review of Metaphysics 45: 483-502; Howsepian, A.A. (1997) “Lockwood on Human Identity and the Primitive Streak” Journal of Medical Ethics 23:38-41; Iglesias, T. (1987) “What Kind of Being Is a Human Embryo?” in Cameron ed. Embryos and Ethics Edinburgh: Rutherford House; Irving, D. (1993) “Scientific Philosophical Expertise: An Evaluation of the Arguments on "Personhood"” Linacre Quarterly 60 (1) 18-45; Jacquette, D. (2001) “Two Kinds of Potentiality” Journal of Applied Philosophy 18 (1); Johnston, M. (1995) “Delayed Hominization” Theological Studies 56; Lee, P. (1996) “When Do Individual Human Beings Come To Be?” in Abortion and Unborn Human Life Washington: CUAP; McCarthy, B. (1997) “The Status of the Embryo: A Theological Approach” in Fertility and Faith Leicester: Intervarsity Press; Meyer, J. (2000) “Human Embryonic Stem Cells and Respect for Life” Journal of Medical Ethics 26 (3) 166-170; Oderberg, D.S. “Abortion” in Oderberg (2000) Applied Ethics: A Non-Consequentialist Approach Oxford: Blackwell; O'Donovan, O.M.T. (1984) “And Who Is a Person?” in Begotten or made; O'Donovan, O.M.T. (1985) “Again: Who Is a Person?” in Channer, J. ed. Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life Exeter: Paternoster Press; Palazzani, L. (1996) “The Nature of the Human Embryo: Philosophical Perspectives” Ethics and Medicine 12 (1), 14-18; Schwarz, S. (1990) “When Does Human Life Begin?” in The Moral Question of Abortion Chicago: Loyola University Press; Sutton, A. (1990) “Arguments for Abortion of Abnormal Fetuses and the Moral Status of the Developing Human Embryo” in Sutton (1990) Prenatal Diagnosis: Confronting the Ethical Issues London: Linacre Centre; Teichman, J. (1985) “The Definition of Person” Philosophy 60: 175-185; Tollefsen, C. (2001) “Embryos, Individuals and Persons” Journal of Applied Philosophy 18 (1); Tonti-Filippini, N. (1992) “Further Comments on the Beginning of Life” Linacre Quarterly 59; Wade, F (1975) “Potentiality in the Abortion Discussion” Review of Metaphysics 29; Watt, H. (1996) “Potential and the Early Human” Journal of Medical Ethics 22; Watt, H. “Embryo Destruction” in Watt (2000) Life and Death in Healthcare Ethics London: Routledge; Wyatt, J. (1998) “When is a Person?” in Matters of Life and Death Leicester: Intervarsity Press; Werpehowski, W. (1997) “Persons, Practices and the Conception Argument” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (5) 479-494; Young, K. (1994) “The Zygote, the Embryo and Personhood” Ethics and Medicine 10 (1) 27; Cf. also Braine, D. (1994) “The Human and the Inhuman in Medicine” in Gormally, L. ed. Moral Truth and Moral Tradition Dublin: Four Courts Press; Reichlin, M. (1997) “The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal” Bioethics 11 (1), 123; Suarez, A. (1990) “Hydatiform Moles and Teratomas Confirm the Human Identity of the Pre-implantation Embryo” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 15:627-635. [Back]
38. Cf. 4.5.5, note 32. [Back]
39. Scolding, N. (2001) “New cells from old”, Lancet 357, 329-330, Feb 3. [Back]