Amici Curiae briefs filed for University Faculty For Life to the U.S. Supreme Court on "fetal personhood"

B. Arguments For "Delayed Fetal Personhood" Are Based On Inaccurate Science

Given that there is now a scientific and medical consensus that the life of every human being begins at fertilization, some are currently arguing that "personhood is only a "social construct",12 or that even though there is a human being present at fertilization, there is no human person present until some later biological "marker event" during the continuum of human embryological development. In other words, these writers make a real distinction between a human being and a human person - and only human persons are due social, ethical or legal rights and protections.

The main purpose of this section is to point out the serious scientific discrepancies in the science used in these "delayed fetal personhood" debates.13 Different conclusions about "personhood" follow from different sets of scientific evidence. Their arguments are as follows:

- Some argue that the early human embryo is only a "blob", a lump of the mother's tissues, and not a human being. Others, e.g., Suarez,14 claim that a human person begins only at the 2-cell stage, with the completion of the genetic input of the program "man". However, the human embryo is not a "blob" or a piece of the mother's tissues. The mixture of chromosomes in the human embryo is unique for that single embryo and different from those in either the mother or the father. The human embryo is a human being - as verified by placing it under a microscope and counting the number of chromosomes - i.e., "46". Finally, at fertilization the completion of the genetic input has already taken place at the 1-cell human zygote stage.

- Bedate and Cefalo15 argue that the human zygote is not a person because it is not specifically human and does not contain "information" about differentiation. It only contains enough genetic information to proceed through the blastocyst stage. After that differentiation and the other processes of embryogenesis depend on molecular information from the mother, "information" which is not present in the zygote. Further, the developing embryo can give rise to biological entities which are not human beings, e.g., hydatidiform moles and teratomas. However, empirically we know that the human zygote is specifically human and does contain and control all of the genetic information for all of the processes of embryogenesis, including differentiation and those processes past the blastocyst stage. Considerable scientific evidence has already been noted above which demonstrates that specifically human enzymes and proteins are produced after fertilization. It has also been demonstrated, precisely, that differentiation is caused by the genetic information in the developing embryo and not by the mother.16 Even molecular information arising within the embryo is determined ultimately by the genetic information in the one-cell zygote (by means of its "genetic information cascade"). Molecular information from the mother is only selectively used by the embryo. Such molecular information does not change the very nature of the developing organism. Finally, hydatidiform moles and teratomas do not arise from genetically normal embryos,17 but from abnormal entities (usually caused by dispermy or parthenogenic eggs; parthenogenesis in humans has never been reported18 which are not, therefore, genetically normal human beings to begin with.

- McCormick and Grobstein19 claim that "personhood" ("ensoulment") cannot take place until about 14 days. Before then there is only a genetic individual (a "potential" person); after, there is also a developmental individual - i.e., a real human person. After fertilization the human zygote undergoes equal divisions, and after the third division the aggregate contains 8 cells "loosely connected". These cells are totipotent, i.e., each can produce a complete adult human being. Thus they are not developmentally single - and therefore, not a person. Also, before 14 days there is only a "pre-embryo" (a "non-person"). That is, at the 5-6 day stage, development does not primarily involve formation of the embryo and its parts [i.e., the inner blastocyst layer of cells] but the "non-embryonic" trophoblast [i.e., the outer layer of cells]. After birth all of the cells from the trophoblast layer are discarded as the placenta, etc. Therefore, the presence of this non-essential trophoblast layer of cells indicates that the 5-6 day "pre-embryo" is not yet developmentally single, and therefore it is not a person. It is only a "genetic" individual, i.e., a "pre-embryo". Also, individuality is not present before 14 days because: a) if two eight-cell stages of different parentage are fused, a single adult is produced, and; b) until 14 days and the formation of the primitive streak twinning can take place. After 14 days twinning cannot take place and the organism is finally "developmentally" single (and therefore a person). Finally, they claim that the genetic individual is not a developmental individual until a single body axis (primitive streak) has begun to form, near the end of the second post-fertilization week when implantation is under way.

However, empirically we know that the cells do not divide equally, but unequally. Also, totipotency is scientifically far more complicated than depicted. E.g., these cells do not each contain the same potential as each other or as the zygote. Totipotency is normal, natural, and actually coded for by the genetic information in the human zygote. These cells are totipotent because certain genes have not yet been silenced by methylation (and other processes) - not because of the reverse claim, i.e., the cells "don't know how many individuals to be yet".20

Empirically we know that the cells of the trophoblast layer [chorion, anmion, yolk sac and allantois] are not "non-embryonic"; and all of these cells are not discarded after birth. The dorsal part of the yolk sac is incorporated into the later embryo as the primordium of the primitive gut. The allantois is represented in the adult human being as a fibrous cord, the median umbilical ligament, which extends from the apex of the urinary bladder to the umbilicus. The allantois is also involved with early blood formation. The primitive blood cells are derived mainly from the epithelial cells of blood vessels in the yolk sac and the allantois.21 Therefore, the 5-6 day stage is both a "genetic" and a "developmental" individual, and there is physical, genetic and developmental continuity from the zygote through the adult stage.

Furthermore, two eight-cell stages of different parentage do not "fuse". Perhaps they mean "recombination". But recombination is not used in this context; it is associated with the crossing over of the male and female genes during the meiotic division of fertilization itself. A chimera and a mosaic are caused by non-disjunction of the chromosomes - not by either "fusion" or by "recombination". And these latter two situations can only arise before the 3-cell stage, not at the 8-cell stage. A mosaic is formed by cells of the same genetic origin, not by different parentages. A chimera can be formed from cells of different parentages, but this takes place at the zygotic stage, not at the 8-cell stage.22

Contrary to their scientific claims, monozygotic twinning can take place after 14-days.23 And, again, their depiction of "multiplicity" is scientifically simplistic. Multiplicity of birth from dizygotic origin appears to be familial (i.e., genetic); and 30% of monozygotic twinning occurs at the 2-cell to 8-cell stages - and not by division of the inner cell mass. Factors determining monozygotic twinning are not known; and multiplicity beyond twinning may include a combination of dizygotic and monozygotic-derived embryos.24 Thus these writers would have to conclude that all presently existing dizygotic twins, and 30% of monozygotic twins could have been ethically destroyed before 14 days. Far too much emphasis has been placed on the occurrence of twinning. If twinning occurs (either from mechanical or natural means), it only signifies that one individual has given way to two individuals. The individuality of the latter in no way diminishes the reality of the individuality of the former. And finally, implantation does not start at the end of the second week post-fertilization, but between 5-6 days. The beginning of the formation of the primitive streak is between 15-19 days and disappears by the end of the fourth week.25

The extent of the inaccurate science used by McCormick and Grobstein (and others) has been puzzling to many embryologists. For example, C. Ward Kischer, a prominent embryologist, remarks that McCormick's new moral status (or lack thereof) for the so-called "pre-embryo" is derived from Grobstein, whose "new embryological stages" are "simply not true". He argues that the "scientific data" they use has been highly selected and leaves out the majority of other relevant data:

It is not a question as to whether science can or cannot decide the question of personhood. Science is not interested in deciding personhood. However, if the socio-legal status of personhood cannot be decided without invoking what is known scientifically, then the whole of scientific data should be used and not arbitrarily selected bits and pieces of data. (emphasis in the original)

... Human embryology is now in danger of being rewritten as a stratagem statement of current socio-legal, but also of late, even theological, issues. Unless the errors are corrected now, we will be in danger of entering a protracted period of false concepts concerning our own development.26 (emphasis added).

In sum, McCormick and Grobstein's distinction between a genetic individual (a "non-person") and a developmental individual (a "person"), as well as their claims about a so-called "pre-embryo" cannot be scientifically sustained. The scientifically inaccurate term "pre-embryo" ought to be excised from the bioethics and legal literature.

- Ford27 argues for "personhood" at 14 days, because before that there are only "groups of cells", a "potential" person, or a "biological individual". Until the blastocyst stage, the cells have not been fully differentiated, which takes place after the formation of the primitive streak (when no twinning can occur). But scientifically we know that full differentiation is not completed until early adulthood;28 certainly it is not completed by the 14-15 day stage. Finally, twinning can take place after 14 days.

- Wallace29 argues for "delayed fetal personhood" by setting up a series of analogies. Each of the "succeeding souls" can be described, he claims, in terms of the "mature" nature of the individuals of its species (e.g., a mature plant, a mature animal, and then a mature human species). If these descriptions are transferred to his model of human embryogenesis - or "delayed fetal personhood" - we should then consider each of these natures as "transient" natures which successively evolve, until the "rational" nature (or "soul") is "infused" and "personhood" is finally attained. The "rational soul" cannot be "infused" until the "matter" is appropriately organized - at about 3 months, and it is the "rational soul" which makes the organism specifically human and which directs and organizes the matter as human.

But, empirically we know that there is no such thing as two kinds of natures of one and the same specific kind of thing. That is, there are not both "transient" and "mature" natures of a plant, an animal or a human being. An acorn is genetically an oak - albeit a tiny one. Thus the analogy is empirically invalid. Also, if the "rational" human nature which is "infused" about 3 months as Wallace claims, is actually descriptive of a "mature" human nature, is it true then that a 3 month fetus is actually a mature human being - and acts and functions as one?

And finally, the matter is "appropriately organized" at fertilization, when we know empirically that there is already a human being with "46" chromosomes. Immediately there are specifically human enzymes and proteins produced (not tomato or frog enzymes); all of the information for cleavage, differentiation, implantation, etc. is already present; by 3 months specifically human functions, reactions, tissues and organ formations have already taken place (empirically the formation of cabbages or giraffe tissues and organs has not taken place). Thus there is no biological need for a "rational soul" to be infused to make it something it already is, i.e., specifically human and directing human formations. That work has already been done by something back at the zygote stage. Thus the very concept of "delayed fetal personhood" is untenable.

- Some argue30 for various "marker events" of "personhood" from about 8 weeks to birth or early childhood (brain criteria, i.e., "rational attributes", or sentience - i.e., the ability to feel pain). Thus "personhood" is determined by the appearance of the nerve net, cortex, or integration of the brain as a whole, etc. These physical structures are the physiological precondition for the capacity for either sentience, or for "rational attributes" (e.g., self-consciousness, autonomy, loving, willing, interacting with one's environment, etc.); or they signal the actual exercising of those capacities.

However, the advocates for the definition of a human person only in terms of either "rational attributes", or only in terms of sentience, are using definitions with very specific philosophical presuppositions: generally Cartesian, rationalist or empiricist. These philosophical presuppositions contain some quite serious theoretical difficulties which preclude them from realistically being used in these "personhood" debates, (considered in Section III).

The scientific evidence for these claims is empirically vague, scientifically controversial, and only "posited" as theories. Many scientists criticize that there is a reading into the scientific evidence more than is physiologically or conceptually possible. E.g., Jones31 argues that there is no scientific evidence which demonstrates the correlation of "consciousness" and the organizing of the nervous system. Scientifically there is no valid parallel, he argues, between "brain death" and "brain birth". "Brain death" is the gradual or rapid cessation of the functions of a brain; "brain birth" is the very gradual acquisition of a function of a developing neural system (which is not a brain). There are no neurological reasons, he states, for concluding that an incapacity for consciousness becomes a capacity for consciousness once this point is past. The nervous system of the 8-week fetus is quite different from that of the 8 month fetus or 2 year old child. Thus it is impossible, he argues, to recognize a distinct point of transition from a "non-brain" to a "brain", or from a non-functioning nervous system to a functioning one. Therefore, Jones concludes, it is impossible to recognize a distinct point of transition from a "non-person" to a "person". To echo the above comments by Kischer, a different Jones has remarked:

The reproductive biologist cannot assign moral status to the sperm or the egg or the fertilized egg or any of the subsequent products that may result from this fusion...The reproductive biologist can help, however, by assuring that other scientists or those who wish to assert a moral status, and use a biological term or concept to do so, know what they are talking about.32 (emphasis added)

Therefore none of these arguments for "delayed personhood" at various biological "marker events" during human embryogenesis are scientifically valid. Every one of them is grounded on inaccurate or misapplied science. Thus they have failed to prove any real valid scientific distinction between a human being and a human person.

C. Arguments For "Delayed Fetal Personhood" Are Based On Historically Inaccurate Or Refutable Philosophical Presuppositions

Many of these arguments for "delayed fetal personhood" also incorporate philosophical claims which are historically inaccurate. The extent of the inaccuracies and the impact they could have in this case, as well as in the formulation of public policy, requires at least that they be briefly identified. Different conclusions about "personhood" follow from different philosophical definitions of a human being or a human person. For further detailed research, references are provided.33

Most of the historical inaccuracies concern the theories of some of the major figures in the history of philosophy. For example, philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, the scholastics, Aquinas and Descartes are misinterpreted, conflated or mixed together indiscriminately. Thus the internal contradiction within Aristotle or Aquinas of a "succession of souls" with their mainstream metaphysics of being is not even acknowledged. The two philosophies are often basically equated, with no awareness of their inherent differences. Both of them are sometimes conflated with scholasticism. Their theories of act and potency are constantly depicted incorrectly (often the source of the contemporary misuse of the terms "potential" or "possible" human being or person) - as are their theories of being, human being, human "soul", and natural law. No mention is made of the severe chorismos or "separation" problems of Plato's or Descartes' mind/body split, nor of the destructive consequences of these theoretical problems on their definitions of a human person, or even on their scientific theories. Part of Aristotle's metaphysics is virtually grafted onto Engelhardt's "metaphysics". And Descartes' purely immaterial rational attributes are mixed invalidly with a Lochean materialistic theory of sentience, theoretically negating any conclusions. This is not a question of "interpretations" or of "translations" - but simply a matter of the misrepresentation of acknowledged historical fact. All of these historical inaccuracies and theoretical contradictions in the premises become embedded in the conclusions of the arguments, and determine the definition of "person" as well as the choice of biological markers which a writer decides to select for "delayed fetal personhood".

Also, historically, there are a number of different "schools" of philosophy which developed over the centuries which often came to different and contradictory philosophical conclusions about reality. Each "school" defined "being" differently, and therefore each defined a human being differently.34 We are all heirs of this legacy - no matter what our academic "field" is.35

Some schools (e.g., Plato, many scholastics and Descartes),36 argue that a human being is defined as at least two substances - e.g. "soul" (or mind), and body - existing independently of each other. The major chronic theoretical problem with these dualistic definitions is that therefore there is a mind/body split, and thus there can be absolutely no interaction explainable or actually possible between these two separate substances - i.e., between the immaterial "Mind" and the separated material "Body" which is suppose to be its physiological substrate.

Some schools (e.g. rationalists) define a human being in terms of only one of the two above "Cartesian" substances - e.g., Reason (or mind). As noted earlier, if rationalists define "personhood" as only "rational attributes", then the following list of human beings are not persons: e.g., the mentally ill, Alzheimer's and Parkinsonian patients, stroke victims, comatose and persistent vegetative state patients, drug addicts, drunks or alcoholics. And since it is empirically correct that self-consciousness, autonomy, etc. are not actually present until early childhood,37 then they must (and do) also argue for the permissibility of the infanticide of perfectly normal healthy human infants. This rationalistic position has been generally articulated in the literature by writers such as Engelhardt and Tooley, who argue for the permissibility of infanticide,38 because empirically actual "rational attributes" are not present until several years after birth. This Court must consider, then, whether it is proper or prudent to incorporate into law these arguments which logically must conclude that the infanticide of perfectly normal human infants is permissible or consonant with the Constitution or acceptable public policy.

Some schools (e.g. empiricists) define a human being in terms of only one of the other two "Cartesian" substances - e.g., Body or matter. This position is often used in the current literature to argue that some higher primates are persons, and some human beings are not persons. And, again, if one is arguing from the materialist premise that a "human person" is defined only in terms of sentience, or the physical integration or functioning of the brain, then they will also have to argue for the permissibility of infanticide, because empirically full integration and sentience is also not completed until several years after birth.

This is, indeed, the conclusion of writers such as Kuhse, Wells and Peter Singer.39 Noting that he agreed with Bentham's description of infanticide as "of a nature not to give the slightest inquietude to the most timid imagination", Singer states:

If the fetus does not have the same claim to life as a person, it appears that the newborn baby does not either, and the life of a newborn baby is of less value than the life of a pig, a dog, or a chimpanzee. (emphasis added).40

Singer continues that we should put aside feelings based on the smallness, helplessness or - sometimes - cute appearances of human infants, and then we can see that the grounds for not killing persons do not apply to newborn infants.41 Again, this Court must consider the logical conclusions of incorporating into law these arguments which logically must conclude that the infanticide of perfectly normal infants is permissible or consonant with the Constitution or acceptable public policy.

These arguments for the permissibility of infanticide are the inevitable logical consequence of defining philosophically incorrectly a human being or a human person in terms of "rationality", or "soul", sentience or brain-related criteria, instead of the whole human nature.

Finally, if it is claimed that they are only arguing for the physiological precondition for either "rational attributes" or sentience, they must concede that the precondition for the "precondition" of "rational attributes" or sentience is the human zygote itself. In fact, all of their arguments for "preconditions" are actually arguments from "potential" (improperly understood, and the type of argument which they claim to reject themselves), and are definitionally and empirically untenable.

Relevant to this case, if the very theoretical structure of an argument is undermined by the use of inaccurate science and blatantly indefensible and objectively refuted problematic philosophical presuppositions, then the conclusions of these arguments should not be persuasive or accepted - much less incorporated into state or federal law.

D. Conclusion

For all of the foregoing reasons, the University Faculty For Life strongly urges the Court to grant the Petition for Certiorari of J..M., individually.


ENDNOTES

1 K.L. Moore, The Developing Human (Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Co., 1982, 3rd ed.), 14ff; B. Lewin, Genes III (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1987), 24 ff. [Back]

2 Lewin (1987), ibid., 386-394, 401.; A. E. H. Emery, Elements of Medical Genetics (New York: Churchill Livingstone, 1983), 93; A. Schnicke et al, "Introduction of the human pro alpha 1 (I) collagen gene into pro alpha 1 (I)-deficient Mov-13 mouse cells leads to formation of functional mouse-human hybrid type I collagen," Proceedings of the National Academy of Science - USA 84:3 (Feb 1987), 764-8. [Back]

3 G. Kollian et al, "The human beta-globulin gene contains a downstream developmental specific enhancer," Nucleic Acids Research 15:14 (July 1987), 5739-47; R.K. Humphries et al, "Transfer of human and murine globin-gene sequences into transgenic mice," American Journal of Human Genetics 37:2 (1985), 295-310. [Back]

4 Emery (1983), op. cit., 103; Mavilio et al, "Molecular mechanisms of human hemoglobin switching: selective under-methylation and expression of globin genes in embryonic, fetal and adult erythroblasts," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences-USA 80:22 (1983), 690. [Back]

5 Lewin (1987), op. cit., 681; Emery (1983), op. cit., 93. [Back]

6 G. Klubertanz, Introduction to the Philosophy of Being (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963); E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949); D. Irving, "Science, philosophy, theology - and altruism: the chorismos and the zygon" in H. May, M. Streignitz, P. Hefner (eds.), Loccumer Protokolle (Rehburg-Loccum, Deutschland: Evangelische Akademie Loccum, 1992); Irving, "Scientific and philosophical expertise: an evaluation of the arguments on 'personhood'", Linacre Quarterly 60:1 (Feb. 1993), 21-22; Irving, "The impact of scientific 'misinformation' on other fields: philosophy, theology, biomedical ethics, public policy", Accountability in Research 2:4 (April 1993), 244-249. [Back]

7 Lewin (1987), op. cit., 11-13, 30; Emery (1983), op. cit., 101-103. [Back]

8 H. B. Veatch, Aristotle: A Contemporary Approach (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1974), Chap. 2,3; G. Klubertanz, The Philosophy of Human Nature (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), 124ff. [Back]

9 Klubertanz (1953), op. cit., 312; B. Ashley, "A critique of the theory of delayed hominization", in D.G. McCarthy and A.S. Moraczewski (eds.), An Ethical Evaluation of Fetal Experimentation: An Interdisciplinary Study (St. Louis: Pope John Center, 1976), 113-133. [Back]

10 Aristotle, in R. McKeon (ed.), The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941, "Metaphysica" (Book Theta) 9.1.1046a-9.8.1050b, p. 826-831; T. Aquinas, On Being and Essence, A. Mauer (trans.) (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1983), 58, 62-63. [Back]

11 K. Doran, "Person - a key concept for ethics," Linacre Quarterly 56:4 (1989), 39; Aristotle, De Anima, in McKeon 1941, op. cit., 1.5.411b, 14-18 and 24-28, p. 554; T. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Fathers of the English Dominican Province (trans.), (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1981, vol. 1), Ia.q.29, a.1, ans., ad. 2, 3, 5, p. 156. [Back]

12 J. A. Robertson, "Extracorporeal embryos and the abortion debate", Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 2:53 (1986), 53-70. [Back]

13 See, e.g., D. Irving, Philosophical and Scientific Analysis of the Nature of the Early Human Embryo (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 1991 Doctoral Dissertation), see summaries pp. 23, 53, 59, 70, 82, 114, 131, 145, 169, 205, 245, 247, 259; C.W. Kischer, "Human development and reconsideration of ensoulment", Linacre Quarterly 60:1 (Feb. 1993), 57-63; J. J. Carberry and D.W. Kmiec, "How law denies science", Human Life Review 18:4 (1992), 105; A. Fisher, "Individuogenesis and a recent book by Fr. Norman Ford", Anthropotes 2 (1991), 199 ff; W.E. May, "Zygotes, embryos, and persons", Ethics and Medics, Part I 16:10 (Oct. 1991); B. Ashley, "Delayed hominization: Catholic theological perspectives", The Interaction of Catholic Bioethics and Secular Society, R. E. Smith (ed.) (Braintree, MA: The Pope John Center, 1992), 163-180; A. Regan, "The human conceptus and personhood", Studia Moralis 30 (1992), 97-127; P. McCullagh, The Foetus As Transplant Donor: Scientific, Social and Ethical Perspectives (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1987); A.A. Howespian, "Who or what are we?", Review of Metaphysics 45 (March 1992), 483-502; G. Grisez, "When do people begin?", Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 63 (1990), 27-47. [Back]

14 A. Suarez, "Hydatidiform moles and teratomas confirm the human identity of the preimplantation embryo," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 15 (1990): 627-635. [Back]

15 C. Bedate and R. Cefalo, "The zygote: to be or not be a person", Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 14:6 (1989), 641; see also, T. J. Bole, III, "Metaphysical accounts of the zygote as a person and the veto power of facts", Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 14 (1989), 647-653; also Bole, "Zygotes, souls, substances, and persons", Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 15 (1990), 637-652. [Back]

16 H. Holtzer, J. Biekl, and B. Holtzer, "Induction-dependent and lineage-dependent models for cell-diversification are mutually exclusive,", Progress in Clinical Biological Research 175 (1985), 3-11; Mavilio et al (1983), op. cit., 664-8; C. Hart et al, "Homeobox gene complex on mouse chromosome II: molecular cloning, expression in embryogenesis, and homology to a human homeo box locus", Cell 43:1 (1985), 9-18. [Back]

17 A.E. Szulmann, U. Surti, "The syndromes of hydatidiform mole. I. Cytogenic and morphologic correlations," American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology 131 (1978), 665-671; M.S.E. Wimmers, J.V. Van der Merwe, "Chromosome studies on early human embryos fertilized in vitro," Human Reproduction 7 (1988), 894-900; also Suarez (1990), op. cit., 627-635. [Back]

18 Moore (1982), op. cit., 32. [Back]

19 Richard McCormick, S.J., "Who or what is the preembryo?", Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 1:1 (1991), 1. [Back]

20 J. Lejeune, testimony in Davis v. Davis, Circuit Court for Blount County, State of Tennessee at Maryville, Tennessee, 1989. [Back]

21 Moore (1982), op. cit., 33, 62-63, 68, 111 and 127. [Back]

22 Emery (1983), op. cit., 57, 83-85. [Back]

23 K. Dawson, "Segmentation and moral status", in P. Singer et al, Embryo Experimentation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); see also, Moore (1982), op. cit., 133. [Back]

24 Kischer (1993), op. cit., 58-59. [Back]

25 Moore (1982), op. cit., 53, 56; Kischer (1993), op. cit., 59. [Back]

26 Kischer 1993, op. cit., 57-63. [Back]

27 N. Ford, When Did I Begin? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 137, 156. [Back]

28 Moore (1982), op. cit., 1. [Back]

29 W. A. Wallace, "Nature and human nature as the norm in medical ethics", in E. D. Pellegrino, J. Langan and J. C. Harvey, (eds.), Catholic Perspectives on Medical Morals (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 1989), 23-53. [Back]

30 E.g., D.G. Jones, "Brain birth and personal identity", Journal of Medical Ethics 15:4 (1989), 173-178; H.-M. Sass, "Brain life and brain death: a proposal for normative agreement", Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 14 (1989), 45-59; C.A. Tauer, "Personhood and human embryos and fetuses", Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 10 (1985), 253-266; M. Lockwood, "Warnock versus Powell (and Harradine): when does potentiality count?", Bioethics 3:3 (1988), 187-213; J. Goldenring, "The brain-life theory: towards a consistent biological definition of humanness", Journal of Medical Ethics 11 (1985), 198-20; Clifford Grobstein, "The early development of human embryos", Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 10 (1985), 213-236; M.V. Bennett, "Personhood from a neuro-scientific perspective", in Doerr et al, Abortion Rights and Fetal "Personhood" (Long Beach: Cresline Press, 1989). [Back]

31 Jones (1989), ibid., 178. [Back]

32 H. W. Jones and C. Schroder, "The process of human fertilization: implications for moral status", Fertility and Sterility 48:2 (August 1987), 192. [Back]

33 For a detailed study see D. N. Irving, Philosophical and Scientific Analysis of the Nature of the Early Human Embryo, (doctoral dissertation, Georgetown University, Department of Philosophy, Washington, D.C., 1991 (especially the summaries on pp. 23, 53, 59, 70, 82, 114, 131, 145, 169, 205, 245, 247, 259; as well as Chapter Five, and Appendices A and B). [Back]

34 E. Gilson (1963), op. cit., esp. Chap. 1; K. Doran (1989), op. cit., 38-49. [Back]

35 A.C. Crombie, Medieval and Early Modern Science (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959), 10; D. Allen, Philosophy For Understanding Theology (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1985). [Back]

36 G. Vlastos, Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978); Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato (New York: Random House, 1937); Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy , in J. Cottingham et al (trans.), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (New York: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1984), 2nd Med., 12; for typical discussions of the theoretical problems of Cartesians, rationalists and empiricists, see: L.J. Eslick, "The material substrate in Plato", in E. McMullin, (ed.), The Concept of Matter in Greek and Medieval Philosophy (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963); C. Fox, Locke and the Scriblerians: Identity and Consciousness in Early Eighteenth-Century Britain (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989); G. Meilander, Challenging the Limits of Dualism (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987); F. Wilhelmson, Man's Knowledge of Reality (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1956); F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy (New York: Image Books, Vols. 1-9, 1962); E. Gilson (1963), op. cit.; N. Kemp-Smith, A Commentary to Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1979), xxxiv, xlii, xliii, xllv. [Back]

37 Moore (1982), op. cit., 1. [Back]

38 H. T. Engelhardt, The Foundations of Bioethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 111; M. Tooley, "Abortion and Infanticide," in The Rights and Wrongs of Abortions, M. Cohen et al (ed.) (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974), 59 and 64. [Back]

3

9 P. Singer, "Taking life: abortion", in Practical Ethics (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 118 and 122-123; see also P. Singer and H. Kuhse, "The Ethics of Embryo Research", Law, Medicine and Health Care 14 (1987), 13-14; also Kuhse and Singer, "For sometimes letting - and helping - die", Law, Medicine and Health Care 3:4 (1986), 149-153; also, Kuhse and Singer, Should The Baby Live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 138. [Back]

40 P. Singer, “Taking life: abortion”, in Practical Ethics (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 122-123. [Back]

41 Ibid., 123-124. [Back]

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